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Because psychological studies of attention and cognition are most commonly per-
formed within the strict confines of the laboratory or take cognitively impaired 
patients as subjects (Parasuraman 1998b; Pashler 1998; Posner 2004; Underwood 
1993), it is difficult to be sure that resultant models of attention adequately account 
for the phenomenon of effortless attention. The problem is not only that effortless 
attention is resistant to laboratory study (but see Moller, Meier, and Wall, chapter 9, 
this volume). A further issue is that because the laboratory is the most common way 
to approach attention, models resulting from such studies are naturally the most 
widely propagated, these models naturally tend to be biased toward features of atten-
tion most amenable to laboratory study, and these models by their implications set 
the agenda for future study that leads back to the laboratory. In this self-reinforcing 
system, features of attention not amenable to laboratory study are naturally neglected 
by researchers. Being that they are neglected, one can surmise that they are not ade-
quately accounted for in current models, and such models, therefore, fail to indicate 
potentially important areas for future study. In this chapter, I will suggest an alterna-
tive model of attention as a heuristic for opening paths to further profitable research. 
The features of attention emphasized in this model are not new, but the synthesis is 
novel and sheds some light on issues relevant to the topic of effortless attention.
I begin with the five following observations:
1. One naturally pays attention to a task of current interest.
2. There are (at least) two distinct modes of attention—selective and diffuse.
3. Attention is a constantly shifting avenue for the assimilation of information.
4. Information is not forced in from outside but is captured through internal
sensitization.
5. Human information processing is fundamentally syntactic.
Combining these five observations yields an explanatory model of attention that
is not only consistent with the data from the many studies on attention in recent 
decades but also allows us to investigate the neglected phenomenon of effortless 
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attention. The model relies on the notions of apertures, draw, and syntax (ADS, for 
short) and will be explicated by addressing each of the above observations in turn. In 
the final part of the chapter, I shall explore how the model expands our understand-
ing of effortless attention.
Interest and Effortless Attention
Csikszentmihalyi and Csikszentmihalyi (1988, 49) postulated a flow channel that 
accounts for effortless attention and action in terms of a balance between challenges 
and skills (see figure 11.1):
Massimini and Carli (Csikszentmihalyi 1997, 31) revised this model, specifying 
further states related to the imbalance of challenges and skills (see figure 11.2).
Under these interpretations, the states of arousal, flow, control, and relaxation are 
all positive affective states. This positive affect partially explains natural human moti-
vation for pursuing and achieving activities that engender flow. However, positive 
affect alone does not tell the whole story.
Under normal circumstances, attention is most easily maintained if one is actively 
interested, so an obvious place to turn is the notion of interest. Paul Silvia (2006) 
summarizes his own work and the work of other recent research programs in the 
behavioral psychology of interest, concluding that interest is distinct from curiosity, 
attention, importance, and intrinsic motivation. He further concludes that no clear 
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Figure 11.1
Psychological states related to challenge and skill balance (Csikszentmihalyi and 
Csikszentmihalyi).
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distinction is warranted between cognitive and emotional interest. What is most rele-
vant to building a complete model of attention is the number of studies he cites 
demonstrating that “interest promotes the development of knowledge and skills” 
(209). This should come as no surprise, but it highlights the need to take interest into 
account as an important variable in the processes that subtend effortless attention, 
which are so closely associated with skill acquisition. Because current models of atten-
tion arise from laboratory studies in which tasks are exogenously motivated, interest 
rarely plays a part in such studies.
Are there any general elements of activities toward which interest turns attention 
when engaged in an activity? If activities can be broken down into elements and it is 
found that certain general elements attract attention, then it may be possible to 
account for interest and investigate its role in flow activities. But what does it mean 
for an external stimulus to attract attention? Without an accurate model of attention, 
this question will be impossible to answer. Therefore, we will turn first to attention 
and return to specific elements of activities and their relation to interest in the “Impli-
cations of the Aperture, Draw, Syntax Model” section below.
Modes of Attention
One way researchers taxonomize attention is into selective attention and vigilance 
(Parasuraman 1998b). Selective attention refers to choosing one task of attention 
from among many, and vigilance to sustaining attention on a chosen task. Selected 
attention is widely studied by cognitive scientists attempting to map its functional 
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Psychological states related to challenge and skill balance (Massimini and Carli).
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and neurophysiological features, and vigilance is often studied in relation to patholo-
gies, such as attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder. Here we’ll try to understand the 
relationship between selected attention and vigilance.
When one concentrates on a task, one’s concentration may be slight or intense 
(Kahneman 1973). Let us call intense selected attention focused. The term vigilance 
presumes a level of success, so let us call the kind of attention that expectantly observes 
a field of stimuli diffuse attention (Faglioni 1990) and say that high intensity of diffuse 
attention is vigilance. In a conscious person, these two modes of attention are always 
simultaneously in operation (Faglioni 1990). Thus, we can run them as axes in a 
phase-space diagram (see figure 11.3) to analyze their relationship. Diffuse attention 
begins at blank attention (C), and increased intensity of attention leads to full vigi-
lance (B). Selective attention begins at blank attention (C), and increased intensity 
leads to full focus (A).
Any position near either axis and toward the blank side seems within the range of 
normalcy. As one approaches the absorption perimeter, the outer limit of attentional 
capacity, evidence suggests that attention tends to one axis rather than the other 
(Parasuraman 1998a), as illustrated—increase in intensity of focus results in a decrease 
in intensity of vigilance, and vice versa.
A dimension not depicted in this figure is effort. What is the relation of effort to 
intensity? Intuitively, there would be a direct correlation—the more effort, the more 
intense one’s attention. We could plot the two different kinds of attention against 
effort as follows (see figure 11.4).
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Selective versus diffuse attention under normal conditions.
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In these diagrams, intensity increases with effort until attention asymptotes regard-
less of increases in effort. An important finding in flow research, however, is that 
subjects report an increase in absorption and a decrease in effort (Csikszentmihalyi 
and Nakamura, chapter 8, this volume; Csikszentmihalyi 1975; see figure 11.5).
An increase in intensity over normal circumstances suggests that flow may facilitate 
the extension outward of the absorption perimeter, and perhaps even the orientation 
of its parabola (see figure 11.6).
An important dimension not depicted here is the scope of one’s attention. While 
selective attention implies a narrow scope and diffuse attention a broad scope, there 
is no indication in this depiction of how broad either scope is. For instance, if I am 
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Attention versus effort under normal conditions.
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Attention versus effort under flow conditions.
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attending to detail x of activity M and am vigilant to other potential details of activity 
M (suppose my attention is close to point D), there is no indication of how vigilant 
I am to details of activity N. With respect to activity N, it could be that I am closer 
to point C—I am not paying attention to any details of activity N nor am I vigilant 
to future potential details. For instance, suppose five men are playing cards in one 
room while their wives are convening a book club in another room, both groups of 
spouses within earshot of the other. All could be near point D with respect to their 
own activity but near point C with respect to the other.
This observation is consistent with research demonstrating that attention is not an 
all-or-nothing proposition with regard to domains of activity—that the field of one’s 
attention and the field of one’s perception are importantly distinct. Attention is con-
ceived here as domain specific, and all subjects will fall somewhere on the selective–
diffuse attention scale with respect to all current and potential domains of activity 
within their perceptual field. It’s not the case that just because a stimulus is within 
one’s field of perception it is also within one’s field of attention (Treisman and Gelade 
1980).
Apertures and Structures
What do these modes of attention suggest about the functional mechanisms of atten-
tion? Most models of attention focus on the selective aspect of attention, which is 
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Selective versus diffuse attention under flow conditions.
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often depicted as a beacon of light illuminating the object or field of attention. Such 
a metaphor implies a single control mechanism directing the beam of light and con-
trolling its intensity. Under a typical behaviorist model, the beam would be controlled 
by external stimuli. Under a voluntarist model, the beam would be controlled by 
subjective choice. Most such models make room for both “top–down” and “bottom–
up” mechanisms.
There are other metaphors for selective attention, as well. The common filter theory 
goes back to Broadbent’s Y-shaped tube model (Broadbent 1957). Zenon Pylyshyn 
(1989) has proposed an INSTantiation FINger (FINST) model of visual attention. These 
models, and others, generally do not attempt to account for diffuse attention, focusing 
instead on various features of and controversies around selective attention. I propose 
that we view diffuse attention as an aperture (see figure 11.7)—not just as a single 
aperture, however, but as multiple subapertures within one larger aperture—in other 
words, as multiple avenues of information processing within a single larger avenue. 
Selective attention will operate within the main aperture only,1 although nonattentive 
processing could be operating in any number of apertures simultaneously.
Attention is understood here as an avenue for the mind to consciously process and 
assimilate information.2 Under the beam-of-light metaphor, the beacon shines on that 
part of the information that the brain processes in consciousness. Such a metaphor 
fails to account not only for the separation of information that occurs but also for the 
Figure 11.7
Apertures of attention, two-dimensional view.
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competing demands of attention, for the negotiation of competing demands, and for 
special attentive states such as flow and meditative absorption.
Under the aperture model, the outer perimeter depicts full attentional capacity 
(which may or may not be elastic). Inside this perimeter lie the subapertures of atten-
tion. These apertures are not mere windows.
An old, and enduring, idea of the way information is processed is via associative 
maps, studied in cognitive psychology under such monikers as hierarchical schemata 
(Houghton and Hartley 1995) and central motive states (Bindra 1974), and recently 
updated as dynamic connectionist contexts (Botvinick and Plaut 2004). Different 
terminology has been used over the years. I will call them structures of reference. If 
we rotate figure 11.7 to peer behind the apertures (see figure 11.8), we will not find a 
black box with a spotlight shining on a stage but rather a network of structures of 
Figure 11.8
Apertures of attention, three-dimensional view.
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reference constructed such that each is uniquely sensitized to potential stimuli within 
overlapping, dynamic domains of activity. The structures are both apertures and 
avenues of processing.
The glue that binds the elements of each of these structures of reference is their 
association with each other within a specific domain of activity—one may call it a 
context. Within a contextual structure of reference (CSR), attenting to an activity 
involves processing information, setting expectations, evaluating relevant cues, 
responding through established pathways within the structure, and constructing new 
pathways according to new developments. The claim is that all conscious attending 
in human cognition occurs within the context of an activity (see Yuri Dormashev’s 
chapter 13 in this volume for a closely related perspective).
The context is a pathway of processing with links having been established in the 
past that allow for rapid processing of responses. A context sets expectations regarding 
what should be attended to (diffuse attention); when a matching cue arises, there is 
selective attention; relevance of this cue to immediate and long-term goals is calcu-
lated according to accumulated information embedded in the structure (long-term 
memory, habit); a response is formulated and executed accordingly; new expectations 
arise. This is a rough accounting of what occurs within one CSR aperture pathway. 
Other CSR aperture pathways will be open simultaneously, and how wide will depend 
on their relevance to the immediate and long-term goals of the subject. One of the 
CSR aperture pathways may be termed fight or flight, one may be termed curiosity, and 
yet another, romance. These are some of the hardwired CSRs, which, no matter how 
much attention is driven through other CSRs, are likely always open to a degree and 
ready to expand with a salient cue.
It should be emphasized that the apertures are understood as dilating and contract-
ing in a constant flux as attention shifts from one activity to another over millisec-
onds. What drives one CSR to gain ascendance over the others, and how is such 
competition adjudicated? CSRs may be linked to a larger hierarchical goal structure 
where input through the CSRs goes for further relevance evaluation. Alternatively, 
they may compete in a Darwinian way for ascendancy,3 with the larger goal hierarchy 
playing some role in which wins out. How factors within the CSRs that drive ascen-
dancy match up with particular internal or external stimuli (Botvinick and Plaut 2004) 
must also be an integral part of the process. My use of the term structure may lend an 
unintended sense of stasis to the model, but these structures are envisioned as 
dynamic—in constant flux with constantly shifting boundaries. Thus, an element 
within one structure may also belong to other structures.
Let us look at an example. A young man in a technologically primitive society (say, 
in the highlands of Borneo) is on a lookout platform in the forest.4 His job is to lash 
some spearheads to spears while keeping watch for any sign of marauding warriors 
from another tribe. He is new to both tasks and not expecting much excitement. When 
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taking up his position, he surveys the surroundings. At this point, a CSR aperture 
pathway that we might call defense opens widest. Expectations are raised for signs of 
danger that he has been taught or has encountered before, all of which have been 
integrated into this pathway—such things as birds taking flight, sounds of snapping 
twigs, signature hoots of neighboring tribes, and so forth. This CSR has primed him 
to respond with urgency to such cues.
After surveying the surroundings, he squats down to begin lashing a spearhead to 
a shaft, a task he has only seen others do and is now trying for the first time. His 
defense CSR contracts, and his “spear-making” CSR dilates, but this CSR is still rather 
empty, and this lack of skill makes it difficult for him to recognize and adjust to 
appropriate cues in the task. On top of this, the previous evening he had had a rivet-
ing encounter with a young woman at a ceremonial dance. His romance CSR keeps 
crowding out his spear-making and defense CSRs.
While making his first spear and daydreaming about his love interest, the defense 
CSR, though comparatively small, is still open, and before the first spear is complete, 
the sound of a snapping twig catches his attention. The romance CSR immediately 
contracts, crowded out by the dilating defense CSR. Without moving, the boy scans 
the surroundings with ears and eyes. A flock of birds takes to the air. He identifies this 
through his defense CSR as another danger signal. He hears a hoot that he can’t 
place—another bad sign identified through the defense CSR. These accumulated 
dangers prompt his defense CSR to temporarily integrate with his fight-or-flight CSR, 
and his heart begins beating faster, his adrenaline flows, and he realizes his unfinished 
spear could be very useful if finished. The integrated defense/fight-or-flight CSR is near 
full dilation until he turns attention to the nascent spear, at which time his spear-
making CSR dilates, forcing contraction of the integrated defense/fight-or-flight CSR.5 
Both CSRs contract and dilate as he shifts attention back and forth. The more he 
concentrates on his spear, the less he is able to attend completely to signals from the 
forest, and vice versa.
We see in this example that selective attention is activated within an activity 
domain which drives diffuse attention. The temporary persistence of diffuse attention 
allows for the integration and assimilation of relevant information via selective 
attention.
A more contemporary example would be a male college student at a football game. 
Actively competing CSRs would likely be socializing, analyzing the game, cheering, and 
sustenance.6 Other CSRs that would simultaneously be open but minimized might be 
unfinished homework and, of course, romance. Imagine if, to the student’s surprise, a 
professor or a friend of his (stern) father sat down next to him. Now, in addition to 
his socialize with elders CSR’s dilating, it will elide with his socialize with friends CSR, 
channeling his responses away from remarks and behavior suspected to be deemed 
distasteful by his neighbor.
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To be more specific, imagine two alternative versions of this scenario. In one, before 
the elder arrives, a referee makes a controversial call unfavorable to the home team. 
The male fan in question, gesticulating threateningly toward the field, shouts a string 
of obscenities. In the alternative version, the same call is made but after the elder 
arrives, in which case the student’s response would be more mild: “I can’t believe 
that,” throwing his hands up. Same cue, different response, guided by a qualitatively 
different CSR.
Now suppose something salient occurs, such as a siren blaring. Salience is often 
considered the mark of an entirely externally driven stimulus. The current model, 
however, would require that every attended cue be processed through a CSR and be 
dependent on two things: the availability of the CSR with respect to other CSRs and 
the sensitivity of the stimulus within the CSR. Depending on the listener, a siren could 
conceivably enter through a curiosity CSR (as with a young child), through a public 
safety CSR (for a distant motorist), or through a danger CSR (for a criminal). At a foot-
ball game, it may enter through a cheering CSR. The CSR through which it enters 
depends on one’s prior experience. For someone new to football games, it would likely 
enter through a danger CSR and then be integrated into a cheering CSR relevant to the 
football game. The actual intention of the siren operator would bear no necessary rela-
tion to the CSR aperture pathways of listeners, but the most seasoned fans would be 
the quickest to channel the sound through the football CSR and respond appropriately. 
A particularly nerdy, though seasoned, fan sitting in the upper bleachers concentrating 
on calculus problems might have the siren enter through a cheering CSR and not attend 
to it at all—not even remember hearing it if questioned about it later.
Again, salience, under this model, is not an independent variable in attention and 
is, instead, predicated upon CSRs. It may be true that we are hardwired with certain 
CSRs, such as fight or flight, through which loud noises are attributed salience. But it 
is also true that such noises will be selected for attention depending only on their 
relevance within a CSR and the status of other competing CSRs. A straightforward way 
of challenging the notion of the inevitability of salient stimuli is to consider external 
context: A neon Coca-Cola sign will be much more salient in the middle of farmland 
than in downtown Tokyo. Another way to challenge it, however, is by considering 
internal context: The bouncing cheerleaders on the sidelines of the football game will 
be more salient to our heterosexual male fan than to his homosexual friend, who 
through his romance CSR finds more salience in the physiques of the players running 
and jumping on the field.
Draw
The postulate above is that the internal conditions of CSRs, in conjunction with 
relevant external stimuli, drive attention. As such, the main drivers of attention are 
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internal rather than external. A salient phenomenon in the environment is best char-
acterized not as a stimulus (thereby implying a behaviorist response) but as a cue, 
implying that there is a preexisting structure of responsiveness sensitized to the rec-
ognition and processing of the phenomenon.
One could try to argue counterfactually that without the stimulus there would be 
no attention to it and therefore attention begins in the stimulus, but if it is true that 
the CSR is always open to some extent and that it is appropriately sensitized to external 
phenomena, then stimulus or not, there is always diffuse attention. Ruth Garrett 
Millikan, discussing language and cognition under a theory she calls biosemantics, 
suggests that we do best to understand biological organisms not as representation 
producers but as representation consumers—a representation has meaning only as 
understood by the system—so consumption is primary (Millikan 1989). Likewise, I 
would argue, a stimulus has the potential to be attended to only insofar as it can be 
assimilated into and processed by an open CSR.
If the salience of external phenomena is dependent on internal constructions, how 
are we to conceive of the flow of information? Traditionally, sense data are conceived 
to impinge on our senses like so many projectiles flying through space; our sensory 
organs let them in, and then our processing pathways filter some out and let others 
through. The problem with the projectile view of information flow is that the infor-
mation is, again, originating externally. What many studies in inattentional blindness 
(Mack, Pappas, Silverman, and Gay 2002; Mack and Rock 1998) have shown, however, 
is that often we simply do not see phenomena that are obviously open to view. Mack 
and Rock (1998, 228) conclude that the most important factor in an object’s capturing 
attention “is the meaningfulness or signal value of the stimulus.” In other words, 
it is not that irrelevant stimuli are filtered out but that only relevant stimuli are 
drawn in.
The projectile view of information flow presupposes that the information will be 
processed unless rejected. The view presented here is that there is no information until 
there is a CSR ready to assimilate and process it (e.g., if NPR is being broadcast in 
the forest and there is no one around to hear it, there is no news there in the forest). 
Does this open me up to a chicken-and-egg objection? No, because an evolutionary-
developmental view of the human being posits a certain amount of hardwiring that 
begins with rudimentary CSRs and allows for them to gradually mature and differenti-
ate (Gopnik and Schulz 2004; Millikan 1989).
I introduce the notion of draw as a way of emphasizing the fundamental role of 
sensitivity in attention. There are two basic claims: (1) We attend only to those 
phenomena to which we are cognitively capable of attending, and (2) once we are 
capable of attending, there is an active internal mechanism that struggles for 
predominance against other active internal mechanisms to receive and process rele-
vant information.
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How can we make sense of a cognitive draw? How can there be a pulling force from 
inside the head that acts on things outside the head? Action at a distance was a 
common problem in early theories of physics—how could it be, for instance, that 
electricity suddenly flows through a channel when there is nothing obviously pushing 
it along? The answer lies in there being a particular difference between one place and 
another. If the voltage on one end of an electrical channel is identical to the voltage 
on the other end, there will be no flow of electricity. Only when the voltage increases 
on one end do electrons flow toward that end. One way of understanding it is that 
the voltage differential establishes a draw that enables the flow of electricity. Just as 
voltage is known more accurately as electric potential, attentional sensitivity in cogni-
tion could be conceived as information potential.
Electricity isn’t the only occurrence of a draw due to a differential in a potential 
channel of a flowing medium. A similar set of phenomena power the flow of air in 
the form of wind. Aside from global processes, such as the Coriolis force, wind is 
generally understood as the flow of air through a channel of pressure differentials, 
from a high-pressure area to a low-pressure area. One way to understand it is that the 
low-pressure area sets up a draw from the high-pressure area. For instance, when a 
window breaks in movie depictions of airplane disasters, the reason that the air is 
depicted as being sucked outwards from within the plane is that the air pressure at an 
altitude of 33,000 feet is much lower than the artificially pressurized cabin.
A third way to think of draw is through economic demand. The analogy of cogni-
tive information flow to economics is felicitous in that the appearance of a product 
on the market originates from the supply end, just as stimuli originate externally to 
the agent. However, just as a product will not move through market channels until 
there is the draw of consumer demand, so information will not flow through cognitive 
channels until there is the draw of attentional sensitivity.
We see still more examples of the action-at-a-distance effect of draw in the cases of 
heat and dissolved substances. It may be best to think of raw sense data (sound 
waves, photons, etc.) as the channel of the information stream, the infrastructure, 
that is always there and of information as the medium that flows through the channel. 
Attention is not a sensitivity to photons but to the information that photons 
carry.
The metaphors, whether explicit or implicit, of attention as a spotlight and of sense 
data as projectiles that would strike and register if not filtered are pervasive in the 
cognitive science literature. What differentiates the model expounded here is the 
realization that attention follows not sense data but rather information. Broadbent 
(1958) distinguished between stimuli and information some five decades ago, but the 
idea still persists today that we will be overwhelmed (even by information) without 
a filtering mechanism. Briefly going back to the beginnings can help put this idea 
to rest.
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A simple stone is bombarded by sound, heat, and the entire range of stimuli from 
the electromagnetic spectrum. Does it feel overwhelmed? Of course not. When life 
formed and successfully opened the first window of sensitivity to its environment, 
was it overwhelmed with so much incoming sensory stimuli? No, because the window 
was open only to a single kind of information that was ultimately adaptive. To every-
thing else, it was like a stone. As creatures became more complex, new sensitivities 
opened up to enable creatures to process new information, but only to the extent that 
it was ultimately adaptive. At no step was there a gush of data that required filtering, 
and that goes for humans, too. William James gave us the term “blooming, buzzing 
confusion,” and we have the common intuition that when babies are born they are 
overwhelmed by sensory stimuli that they cannot interpret. It’s more likely, however, 
that infants are born with a limited number of active domains of activity within which 
they are naturally responsive to what we would consider primitive information. Sen-
sitivity and responsiveness would then expand in tandem.
As our sensitivity expands within domains of activity, the specific circumstances 
combined with specific internal conditions of the CSR together select information as 
needed. There is no perceived bombardment and no filter. Pylyshyn’s (1989) FINSTs 
that point outward, index, and track features of visual stimuli are similar in that they 
are endogenously prepared to respond to specific kinds of features of the external 
world rather than accepting everything and then dumping what is not needed.
Syntax
The claim is made above that all human attention arises within a domain of activity, 
so it is important to inquire into what is meant by the term activity. An activity is 
understood here as a set of constraints that are related in such a way that they facilitate 
the accomplishment of a goal.7 This set of related constraints is understood as a syntax 
because it provides a dynamic structure for an unfolding concatenation of actions 
(including thoughts).8 The syntax of daily etiquette is implicit, whereas the syntax of 
chess is more explicit, with its large body of rules, but the suggestion here is that the 
syntax of any activity goes beyond any explicit set of rules to encompass all constraints 
on thought and action relevant to the activity as a situational, temporal, autopoietic 
enterprise. Thus, the syntax of competitive downhill skiing includes not only the 
international rule book but also the resistance of its moguls and gates and the implicit 
rules of socializing among competitors.
Constraints are parameters within which one may respond to a cue.9 Cues are rec-
ognized according to the total set of constraints, the syntax. How good one is at 
negotiating a syntax will often depend on one’s amount of experience within that 
syntax. Cues gain and lose salience accordingly, and responses become more or less 
automatic accordingly. Cues are phenomena the appropriate response to which 
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advances one toward a goal. They can be external or internal, perceived or cognized, 
and sensitive or insensitive to response. A cue can be a rock on a cliff face, a move in 
a mental chess game, a batting eyelash, and so on. Each of these cues is recognized 
within a syntax, and a response follows according to the constraints of that syntax.
The final element in this formulation of an activity is the response. Once the goals 
and syntax are organized in a functional way and one is able to recognize relevant 
cues, two things occur in cognition: predictions are made, according to which responses 
are primed to possible future cues, and immediate responses are executed (the effects 
of which may become future cues). This should not suggest, however, that potential 
responses are temporally secondary to the recognition and assimilation of cues. The 
capacity to respond—the syntax of response—may play an active, and even necessary, 
role in establishing the initial sensitivity to the cue, itself (see Borghi 2005; Hommel, 
chapter 5, this volume). A response would then be functionally inseparable from a 
cue, even though in real time a response may be temporally separate or may not even 
arise at all. In this sense, a cue would entail at least a potential and approximate 
response in order to be a genuine cue. This conceptual necessity linking response to 
cue, does not, however, mean that the response is actually necessary, or that a non-
habituated action may not be identified post hoc as an appropriate response.
For everyone but a newborn (perhaps even a newborn), every activity involves some 
amount of prior cognitive habituation. Habituation is the Hebbian facilitation of 
response through repetition to a general cue within the general constraints of a syntax 
and according to generalized situational demands. An initial step in the habituation 
process is recognizing a cue as general—as something the likes of which may occur 
again under similar circumstances and require a similar response. A related step, for-
mulation of a response, is established in the same context. If the context is novel, 
response formulation will happen haphazardly at first, arrived at by navigation through 
related but not identical CSRs, which elide in and out until appropriate responses are 
arrived at and incorporated into a nascent new CSR. Habituation is viewed here as the 
construction and reinforcement of the pathways of a CSR.
In addition to syntax, goals, and response, the final element of an activity relevant 
to this model is how the response is executed. William Calvin posited the notion of 
the ballistic thought (Calvin 1993), suggesting that cognition involved in time-con-
strained, complex serial actions is a borrowing of the same cerebral mechanisms that 
allow us to accurately hurl a projectile at a target. Launching mental calculations is 
like launching a series of actions that once started cannot be adjusted via feedback 
and response, because the response time is too long. I suggest that the real-time nego-
tiation of the syntax of a CSR is just this kind of ballistic thought, except that in an 
activity, it is more open to revision than in an action, itself. It’s difficult to think of 
a human response that is not in some sense ballistic, that does not involve the initia-
tion of a concatenation of cerebral activity that proceeds in some way on its own.
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Habituation involves the automation of the links in the concatenation. Thus, each 
of the three steps of response involves the possibility of habituation: the recognition 
of cues (what to be sensitive to), choosing a response (why this response and not 
another), and the cognitive and motor activity that are the response (how to execute 
it and when—i.e., timing). The provisional answers to the what, why, how, and when 
of an action are the syntax of a CSR and allow for the smooth unfolding of the per-
ception–action cycle.
Implications of the Aperture, Draw, Syntax Model
As I suggested at the start of this chapter, adopting any particular model of attention 
will entail specific available inferences from the model. What is the payoff for using 
the ADS model? I think there are many.
Given the elements of an activity—the goals, the syntax, and the response—we can 
begin to envision a theory of optimization of action. The obvious avenues of interven-
tion are at any of the four opportunities in the process of habituation of a response 
just noted: the what, the why, the how, and the when. These may be more or less 
important depending on the weightings of certain aspects within a syntax. In chess, 
the why is most important; in figure skating, it is the how; in urban warfare, it is the 
what; and the when is crucial in all of these examples (though less obviously so in 
chess).
As discussed, the use of the term syntax should not give the sense of an intransi-
gence to modification. Not only is a CSR constantly open to modification but its place 
in the competitive hierarchy for attentional predominance is also constantly open to 
modification. As a CSR becomes richer through experience, assuming at least a moder-
ate level of associated positive affect, it will compete more successfully for attention, 
and an interest may develop.
In this model, interest is best defined as motivation through enjoyment. An under-
appreciated corollary to Csikszentmihalyi’s theory of flow is his distinction between 
enjoyment and pleasure. The full passage is worth rehearsing:
Playing a close game of tennis that stretches one’s ability is enjoyable, as is reading a book that 
reveals things in a new light, as is having a conversation that leads us to express ideas we didn’t 
know we had. Closing a contested business deal, or any piece of work well done, is enjoyable. 
None of these experiences may be particularly pleasurable at the time they are taking place, but 
afterward we think back on them and say, “That really was fun” and wish they would happen 
again. After an enjoyable event, we know that we have changed, that our self has grown: in some 
respect, we have become more complex as a result of it.
Experiences that give pleasure can also give enjoyment, but the two sensations are quite differ-
ent. For instance, everybody takes pleasure in eating. To enjoy food, however, is more difficult. 
A gourmet enjoys eating, as does anyone who pays enough attention to a meal so as to discrimi-
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nate the various sensations provided by it. As this example suggests, we can experience pleasure 
without any investment of psychic energy, whereas enjoyment happens only as a result of 
unusual investments of attention. (Csikszentmihalyi and Csikszentmihalyi 1988, 46)
A person is interested in activities that lead to enjoyment but not to pleasure. One 
is interested in gardening but not shooting heroin. Drinking wine in an enjoyable 
way may further develop an interest that enriches the enjoyment. Drinking wine in 
a pleasurable way leads to inebriation. Enjoyment and pleasure are not mutually 
exclusive, but interest is associated with enjoyment, not pleasure. Further, people are 
not interested in activities that do not yield any enjoyment whatsoever. Researchers 
who study interest confirm that interest is closely associated with the understanding 
of enjoyment offered here, but because they do not make the enjoyment–pleasure 
distinction, conclusions in the literature state that “interest and enjoyment are distinct 
positive emotions” (Silvia 2006, 29). The confluence of enjoyment and interest, in my 
view, is that they both enrich CSRs in a positive way.
There is obviously a tight correlation, probably a mutually reinforcing relationship, 
between interest, enjoyment, and flow. Achievement of one, therefore, likely yields 
achievement of the others, suggesting that if one wishes to cultivate or increase inter-
est in an activity, engendering flow would be of some assistance. Achieving flow 
intentionally, however, can be elusive. For this reason, it would help to understand 
potential obstacles to flow.
Because flow depends on a balance of challenge and skill (and assuming timely 
feedback), any imbalance would diminish chances of achievement. Thus, two primary 
obstacles to flow are high challenge/low skill and, conversely, low challenge/high skill. 
A third obstacle is distractions (internal or external), and finally, even if there is a 
balance of challenge and skill and an absence of distractions, flow may still be difficult 
to achieve if there is a lack of interest. There we are back at interest.
In most activities, when the first two obstacles are encountered, adjustments in 
challenge level are the easiest to make, and practice results in an increase in skill. The 
most difficult adjustment to make is when the level of skill is too high in relation to 
the level of challenge, as in monotonous assembly-line or office work. Csikszentmih-
alyi relates the story of an assembly-line worker who increased the challenge level of 
his work activity by fabricating personal challenges with relation to the demands of 
his job (Csikszentmihalyi 1990, 39). Something similar can be observed in children at 
play, and this may actually be one of the functions of play—to build CSRs through 
incrementally more difficult challenges.
Why does Johnny climb on the low walls, avoid cracks, and kick rocks while 
walking home from school, instead of walking like a typical adult? One explanation 
is that he increases the level of challenge. He has already mastered walking, and just 
walking is boring—there is no sense of enjoyment. By fabricating challenges and 
meeting those challenges, he increases his level of enjoyment, in addition to his skills 
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of balance, locomotion, and so on. This natural desire to meet challenges and the 
natural satisfaction gained from achieving goals may go a long way in explaining why 
children learn so readily. It also goes a long way in explaining how to overcome the 
obstacle of low challenge.
At the level of the CSR, the introduction of new challenges adds complexity to the 
activity’s syntax. A sports coach, for instance, keeps the attention of players while 
emphasizing fundamentals by creating a number of high-challenge training exercises 
and keeping the players moving from one exercise to the next. However, this process 
is extrinsic to the players. To make the activity autotelic, the athlete must, himself or 
herself, incorporate such challenges into his or her own CSR. The self-motivated 
athlete must work on the cognitive level as well as the somatic—building challenges 
into an otherwise boring workout routine.
Distractions are an interesting case and a good illustration of the usefulness of the 
aperture model of attention. Under the aperture model, when one is fully engaged in an 
activity, that activity’s CSR aperture pathway widens until nearly all attentive processing 
capacity is monopolized by that CSR, blocking out competing CSRs—the would-be dis-
tractions. Competing CSRs can distract only when the desired activity’s CSR has not 
grown to ascendancy or when that ascendancy cannot easily be maintained.
William James said that there is no such thing as sustained attention, only atten-
tion renewed. This is consistent with the aperture model of attention in which differ-
ent CSRs are competing for ascendancy under normal conditions and, from a subjective 
point of view, it therefore takes effort to sustain (repeatedly renew) any one CSR for 
an extended period of time. I suggest that when a CSR is opened to ascendancy, its 
predominance is usually precarious because it is vulnerable to other CSRs’ attempting 
to simultaneously dilate. Mental effort can be understood as the deployment of cogni-
tive resources to renew conscious attention to an activity. The more vulnerable an 
ascendant CSR is relative to the strength of competing CSRs, the greater the effort 
required to maintain attention. One can analogize the process to pedaling a bicycle. 
To maintain momentum on a flat surface (normal conditions), one must exert energy 
by pedaling. To maintain momentum on an upward incline (distracted conditions), 
one must pedal harder. To maintain momentum going downhill, however, no expen-
diture is required. Flow activities, by monopolizing attentive capacities, achieve a 
stable momentum such that they endure without external propulsion and so can 
persist despite incursions from other CSRs. Effortless attention, then, is constituted by 
the autotelic maintenance of a CSR. The syntax is so tightly constructed, the facility 
of responses so automatic, and the information flow so large, that the momentum 
created dominates the entire perception–action cycle, thereby inhibiting the rise of 
other CSRs.
As discussed above, the fourth obstacle to flow—lack of interest—is related to 
enrichment of a CSR and positive affect from enjoyment. Interest in activities is often 
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neglected as a subject of study, I believe, because it is understood as subjective, like 
taste: To say that one is interested in baseball is like saying one has a taste for spicy 
food or impressionist painting. As such, it is written off, like taste, to unanalyzable 
personal preference (see Dormashev, chapter 13, this volume for a different and more 
subtle view of personal taste, which is closer to my notion of interest). Interest, I am 
suggesting, however, increases in an activity with the complexity of one’s CSR (assum-
ing concomitant positive affect). But what are the ways in which one’s CSR may be 
complex and increase in complexity? There may be many; below I describe two: for-
mality of actions and syntax of actions.
Formality in an action refers to the narrowness of the parameters of movement—
the lower the amount of flexibility (the fewer correct10 ways to make the movement), 
the higher the formality. Consider dance. For teenagers at a high school dance, the 
degree of formality in any one movement is low. For a traditional ballerina, however, 
the degree of formality in each movement is extremely high—there are precise ways 
in which to execute each movement, and going outside those parameters would be 
perceived as incorrect.
Syntax in a set of actions refers to the parameters constraining how one action is 
concatenated with the next and is directly related to syntax in a CSR; since CSRs are 
functionally intermodal and internal cognition eventuates in external action, it makes 
sense that syntax in an action is part of the syntax of a CSR. Again, consider dance. 
For teenagers at a high school dance, how one strings one action of the dance to the 
next generally makes little difference, and so the degree of syntax is low. For the bal-
lerina in a tightly choreographed classical dance, however, there is a very high degree 
of syntax, and if one move is out of order, even if the formality of the movement is 
executed with virtuosic brilliance, it will be perceived as incorrect.
Let us distinguish an activity from an action. Swinging a bat is an action, while 
playing baseball is an activity. We may categorize all activities based on the degree of 
formality of the actions that constitute them. Imagine a continuum with completely 
formal activities (i.e. those composed of highly formal actions), such as choreographed 
dance, martial arts forms, or acrobatics, on one end. On the other end will be com-
pletely informal, or open-ended, activities (those with informal actions), such as a 
high school dance or eating a grape.11 Most activities will have both formal and infor-
mal components, and, therefore, fall somewhere between the two extremes. Entertain-
ing guests, for instance, would appear toward the informal end, while driving and 
making pottery might appear somewhere in the middle.
We may also categorize activities according to another continuum, namely, the 
amount of syntax involved in connecting the actions together within the activity. 
Activities with a higher degree of syntax may be called more syntactic, and those with 
a lower degree of syntax less syntactic. We can also place activities on this continuum 
with respect to others. For instance, a classical ballet dance would be highly syntactic, 
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as would chess and, perhaps, driving. Entertaining guests and executing martial arts 
moves would be moderately syntactic, and eating a grape, making pottery, and execut-
ing unchoreographed acrobatic moves less syntactic.
Let us now combine these two continua into two axes in a phase-space diagram 
(see figure 11.9)—formality being the vertical axis and syntax being the horizontal 
axis. Fully formal and highly syntactic activities, such as a symphony performance or 
a highly ritualized ceremony, will fall at the top right, while informal nonsyntactic 
activities, such as eating a grape, will fall at the bottom left. Elsewhere on the grid, 
we will find driving (middle right—lots of syntax, less formality), martial arts practice 
(top middle—lots of formality, less syntax), chess and other games (bottom right—lots 
of syntax, very little formality), painting, sculpture, and other arts (middle left—some 
formal techniques but little syntax), and baseball and other sports (center—a moderate 
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Figure 11.9
Action diagram: formal versus syntactic activities.
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amount of both formal actions and syntax). We can now identify activities as belong-
ing to one of four groups: formal (top left), syntactic (bottom right), stylized—both 
syntactic and formal (top right)—and open-ended—neither syntactic nor formal (bottom 
left).
Studying this diagram, one may surmise that among the general populace flow is 
most commonly found in syntactic and formal activities. Activities with the highest 
probability of engendering flow likely fall at the intersection of these two squares, 
where we find such activities as playing popular music, ballroom dancing, and all 
kinds of sports. Outside of these two squares, in the stylized activities and the open-
ended activities, is where we find flow the most difficult to achieve, on the one hand 
because challenges are too high, and on the other because challenges are too low.
With the help of this way of conceptualizing the relationship between activities 
and flow, we can get a bit more purchase on the question of overcoming obstacles to 
flow. Consider, first, what it takes to achieve flow in open-ended activities, such as 
leisurely walking to a destination, washing the dishes, taking a shower. In activities 
such as these, in which the degree of formality and syntax are so low as to present 
very little challenge, other CSRs easily usurp predominance because there is not 
enough challenge in the formality or syntax of the actions to maintain momentum. 
In typical flow activities, habit is an ally because it allows you to execute part of a 
complex action or set of actions while paying attention to other, more subtle, features 
of the activity. In open-ended activities, habit is the enemy because there are no subtle-
ties of form or syntax of the activity to move on to.
We discussed above that introducing artificial challenges to an activity is one way 
to overcome low challenge. Another way is through the practice of mindfulness. 
Mindfulness is a form of meditation in which one keeps various elements of an oth-
erwise habituated activity in attention. Meditation, in all its stripes, does one thing 
well—it destroys habits of mind. One of the most intransigent and difficult to identify 
habits is the very process in which attention transitions rapidly, successively, repeat-
edly, and unnoticeably from one CSR to the next (let’s call it attention substitution). 
Traditionally, the first step in Buddhist meditation is to recognize the process of atten-
tion substitution (phrased in different terms) and prevent the attention from following 
the ascending CSR. Attention substitution is easy enough to experience. Simply sit 
still and do nothing, paying attention only to your natural breathing and noticing 
how often your attention shifts to something else. Each “something else” is a compet-
ing CSR.
In this breath meditation, one has formed a meditation CSR, which is so devoid of 
both formality and syntax that it is nearly empty of any content, whatsoever. Of 
course, this is difficult to maintain against other more established, richer, or more 
urgent CSRs. The method of this kind of meditation more generally (terminology 
varies, so I’ll call it open meditation for simplicity) is to allow a competing CSR to arise 
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but then to abandon it and come back to the meditation CSR. In effect, this type of 
meditation CSR is a meta-activity that takes attention, itself, as its subject. There are 
two important ways in which the activation of CSRs is habituated. One lies in how 
various CSRs are interlinked, and so repeatedly moving from one to the next by virtue 
of these connections will be habituated. The second way is through the very process 
of allowing different CSRs to arise one after another, which is a deep habit that goes 
back to infancy. The practice of abandoning a newly ascendant CSR serves to disha-
bituate the meta-activity (attentional substitution) in which CSRs spontaneously 
compete with each other, to diminish the chance of the ascendant CSR’s attempting 
to gain ascendance again—like an action that fails to receive positive feedback. Over 
time—weeks, months, and even years—the meditation CSR, during the activity of 
meditation, expands to monopolize all of attention, and competing CSRs fail to arise. 
The anomaly of this kind of meditation is that it can be maintained despite so little 
apparent complexity of content and so little information flow; however, this is, of 
course, explained by the understanding that the activity of attentional substitution 
has itself been modified such that competing CSRs no longer compete as vigorously.
From open meditation, let us return to mindfulness meditation, a form of medita-
tion adopted during active life. Mindfulness is said to be most effective when it is 
coupled with sitting meditation as just described. If competing CSRs have been muted 
through the successful cultivation of a meditation CSR, then when performing normal 
habituated tasks, competing CSRs are less likely to arise. As mentioned above, actions 
naturally concatenate in syntactic series, and in the process of habituation these cog-
nitive processes are tucked away for automatic processing. Mindfulness practices bring 
these processes back to the foreground. While walking, one notices one’s balance, 
one’s gait, one’s breathing, and as many elements of these that one can bring to mind. 
The challenge lies in identifying these elements, attending to them in turn, noticing 
subtle characteristics, and even fine-tuning them. In this way, one reconstructs the 
CSR, enriching both its syntax and formality, moving it from an open-ended activity 
further toward the center of the action diagram, where enjoyment and sustained 
attention will more likely ensue. This is how mindfulness mediation can assist in 
achieving flow in low-challenge/high-skill situations.
In this section, we have circled back to the topic of the first section (“Interest and 
Effortless Attention”)—the neglected role of interest in accounting for effortless atten-
tion in flow. The original intention was to begin to see how the ADS model of atten-
tion can yield new insights into the diverse phenomena associated with attention. 
This was done by further explicating interest with respect to CSRs and then consider-
ing how interest, enjoyment, and flow may reinforce each other in activities that have 
a moderate amount of formality and syntax of actions. Also, not only did the model 
make sense of how mindfulness exercises can be useful in raising the level of challenge 
in order to facilitate flow but it also made sense of meditation, itself. Finally, this 
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model helped account for the phenomenon of effortless attention itself, conceived as 
the highly automated negotiation of a tightly constructed, complex syntax with a very 
high flow of information. Combined, these provide a momentum in a CSR that inhib-
its competing CSRs.
Conclusion
The purpose of presenting the formality–syntax diagram (figure 11.9) is to demonstrate 
how understanding attention via the aperture, draw, syntax model can lead to a more 
fruitful theoretical engagement of features of cognition that are associated with atten-
tion. As discussed, effortless attention becomes quite a bit less mysterious when it is 
understood as the inhibition of competing CSRs in the normal process of attention 
substitution, either by momentum of the ascendant CSR, as in flow, or by the diminu-
tion of the substitution process, itself, through meditation. The hope is that this model 
will open up new avenues of profitable exploration for future research on attention.
Limitations of This Model
One obvious limitation of this model is that it claims no direct correspondence to 
neurophysiology, and for this reason, it may be open to objections from readers 
attempting to apply it to human neurophysiology. For instance, one might object that 
neurophysiologists have demonstrated that attention is not a unitary phenomenon, 
and yet the ADS model of attention presumes that it is. I believe these confusions can 
be cleared up because although this model is merely a functional model, the aim is 
to account for human cognitive functions that are underpinned by neurophysiological 
processes. Thus, any neurophysiological processes that underpin functions that con-
tradict it would invalidate it. In the case of the nonunitary nature of attention, the 
ADS model posits not that there must necessarily be one physical location in the brain 
that is a channel of all attentional processes but that the neurophysiological processes 
that underpin attention act as one functional channel, as if there were only one physi-
ological channel. Just as physicists include a notion of a center of gravity in models 
of physical motion even though one cannot locate a center of gravity in the physical 
universe, so this model posits a central channel of information flow even though no 
such physical channel exists in the brain.
Another limitation is that this model is purported to apply to conscious attention, 
and consciousness is a notion only tenuously supported by the cognitive scientific 
literature. By “conscious,” I am simply referring to the explicit–implicit, controlled–
automatic distinction common in the literature (but see Blais, chapter 6, this volume). 
I am suggesting that in this model of attention, there is neither explicit nor implicit 
activity alone but necessarily both together. If it were all implicit, there would be no 
attention, as such. (This is not to say that there would be no processing. It is a matter 
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of stipulation—attention to one’s actions is understood here as involving awareness 
of some of the relevant events, by definition.) If it were all explicit, the perception–
action cycle would slow to a snail’s pace.
Finally, the model is limited by the lack of empirical data supporting it, particularly 
with respect to the formal–syntactic distinction in the last section. As suggested at the 
beginning of the chapter, this limitation is due partly to the constraints placed upon 
attention research by the laboratory emphasis. The suggestion here is that such an 
approach has limited our understanding of attention due to a lack of empirical studies 
of attention in naturalistic, ecologically valid activities. Therefore, it is not that the 
model lacks empirical support but that the model predicts empirical findings from 
studies that have not yet been conceived due to the inferential poverty of current, 
implicit and explicit, models of attention.
Notes
1. I ignore the possibility of divided attention but only for the sake of brevity. One may note 
that in the diagram, a second aperture is larger than the other minor apertures, and one may 
take this to be attentive to a second domain more or less simultaneously.
2. Researchers often stress neurophysiological evidence that attention is not a unitary process. 
This is true at the preconscious level, which this model takes into account via the subapertures. 
There is no accounting here for the actual systems of attention because this is a higher level 
functional model rather than a lower level physiological or computational model.
3. Edelman (1987) was the first to suggest Darwinian-type competition among neuronal pro-
cesses. Calvin (1993, 238) later posited the brain as a “Darwin machine” in which “the brain 
selects the sequences of schema.”
4. Anthropological inaccuracies notwithstanding.
5. Again, specifying a position on divided attention is not important. It could be that two CSRs 
are simultaneously open halfway or are more fully open but only in succession. What matters 
is the proportion of their averages compared over a short period of time and that an increase of 
intensity in one CSR leads to a decrease in sensitivity in others.
6. Of course, the monikers postulated to indentify CSRs may be taken as more or less appropri-
ate. While a sustenance CSR, for example, may have an emphasis on genuine nutrition at one 
point in time, it may have an emphasis on pleasure at another point, or any combination of 
the two.
7. Botvinick and Plaut state that “there are many types of routine behavior for which it is not 
straightforward to identify discrete, explicit goals, for example, taking a walk or playing the 
violin” (Botvinick and Plaut 2004, 423) and that such activities may be driven, instead, by exter-
nal cues. How correct this claim is depends on what one means by “discrete, explicit goals.” In 
the model offered here, by goals, I mean any directedness in an activity such that action in the 
activity can be judged in at least a tenuous way successful or not. Routine activities may be acti-
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vated by external cues, but they will still have a directedness to them, even though such direct-
edness may be as general as preserving homeostasis, satisfying curiosity, alleviating stiffness, or 
killing time. Further, it should be stressed that I make no claim as to whether the goals guiding 
activities are conscious or to their number. It may be that a goal is unconscious while the behav-
ior, itself, is conscious, and it may be that multiple goals within a CSR are driving an activity.
This deserves a bit more discussion. Consider John Conway’s Game of Life (Gardner 1970). 
In this game, a simple set of instructions leads to temporally unfolding, complex, patterned 
movement. We can accurately say that these are parameter-constrained “movements” but not 
goal-driven ones. This would be equivalent to a decontextualized human action, such as raising 
a hand. I suggest that such actions in humans are always embedded in goal-directed activities 
and do not arise solely due to external cues. A domain of activity (CSR), which contains the 
encoding for potential actions, may arise from attentional ascendency prompted by external cues 
but only in conjunction with internal sensitivity, which is itself tied to some general or specific 
goal or goals.
8. It is true that neural network researchers often exploit nonlinear dynamics in their models of 
cognition (as in gradient descent learning) and that some cognitive scientists have had great 
success with stochastic equations that result in simulated behavior that appears to mimic features 
of human cognition. Nevertheless, such cognitive processes in a normal human being are still 
fundamentally goal driven (i.e., directed), are parameter bounded, and are related in nonrandom 
ways to other goal-driven, parameter-bounded cognitive processes. Thus, my claim of the syn-
tactic nature of cognition is not damaged by the prospect of stochastic processes in cognition. 
If such processes occur, they likely occur at one or two stages in the cognition of attention: (1) 
in the online approximations of an unfolding action—as such they still occur at a level that is 
subservient to nonrandom, syntactic processes; (2) in the ongoing spontaneous neural activity 
that subtends endogenous CSR fluctuations. If both of these are the case, there would be a beauti-
ful hierarchy of levels, with randomness embedded in syntax and syntax embedded in random-
ness, and so on.
9. In attention research, a cue is often understood as a preliminary stimulus that precedes a target 
stimulus and directs attention to it. Here, however, I am replacing the term stimulus with the 
term cue, to emphasize that there is no stimulus without context. Cues are primary.
10. The correctness of a formal action can be judged on either normative grounds (e.g., move-
ments in classical ballet) or instrumental grounds (a correct golf swing, for instance, is an effective 
one).
11. There is only one way to swallow that I can think of, but there are an infinite number of 
ways to move the grape to the mouth and to chew, even if we habitually choose only one. For 
easy verification, observe children at the table.
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